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EU Policy on East Timor

Fulfilling the potential of the Common Position

The European Union[1] Council of Ministers adopted its first Common Position on East Timor[2] on 26 June 1996 after months of debate and years of pressure from campaigning groups in member states, who greeted it as a potentially useful tool. While there is a danger that EU institutions will use the Common Position in a limited way, EILÍS WARD argues that alongside the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) statement of April 1997, it could provide a solid framework for progressive change. Here she analyses the content of the Common Position and suggests what European and other northern voluntary organisations (NVOs) can do to maximise its potential.

The main part of the EU Common Position on East Timor is contained in two articles:

Article 1

The European Union, referring to its previous declarations on the situation in East Timor, intends to pursue the following aims:

1) to contribute to the achievement by dialogue of a fair, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution to the question of East Timor, which fully respects the interests and legitimate aspirations of the Timorese people, in accordance with international law;
2) to improve the situation in East Timor regarding respect for human rights in the territory.

Article 2

To pursue the aims referred to in Article 1, the European Union:

1) supports the initiatives undertaken in the United Nations framework which may contribute to resolving this question;
2) supports in particular the current talks under the aegis of the United Nations Secretary General with the aim of achieving the solution referred to in point 1) of Article 1, effective progress towards which continues to be hampered by serious obstacles;
3) encourages the continuation of Intra-Timorese Dialogue meetings in the context of this process of dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations;
4) calls upon the Indonesian government to adopt effective measures leading to a significant improvement in the human rights situation in East Timor. In particular by implementing fully the relevant decisions adopted in this connection by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights;
5) supports all appropriate action with the objective of generally strengthening respect for human rights in East Timor and substantially improving the situation of its people, by means of the resources available to the European Union and aid for action by NGOs.[3]

This paper examines how the Common Position came to be adopted; how significant it is; how it has been implemented so far; and what should be done if it is to be put to its maximum use.

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THE EUROPEAN UNION AND EAST TIMOR: A BRIEF HISTORY

EU policy on East Timor has evolved slowly. The European Parliament never doubted that Indonesia was infringing international law in East Timor. However, it was only when internal pressures (from EU member states and civil society) and external pressures (as a result of East Timor's increased profile within the United Nations and other multilateral fora) were felt that a common position within the EU became desirable.

There are at least three reasons why it took the European Union so long to develop a coherent policy towards East Timor. First, when Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975, issues of justice and human rights were understood through the divided loyalties of the Cold War – the larger western powers, such as the United States, Japan and Australia, defended Jakarta, while the rights of the East Timorese were defended by the Soviet bloc within the United Nations. Most European powers remained silent and usually abstained in votes on the issue at the UN General Assembly. Second, Indonesia's role in aiding European countries' relations with other ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations) states meant many EU members were reluctant to support self-determination for East Timor.[4] Third, before Portugal joined the European Community in 1986 no member state had a particular interest in promoting the case of the East Timorese people.

The Portuguese constitution, adopted after the 1974 revolution, obliges Portugal to 'promote and safeguard the right to self determination and independence of East Timor' and empowers the Portuguese president and government to 'perform all acts necessary for achieving the[se] aims'.[5] Consequently, after Portugal became an EU member, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers began to discuss East Timor. Between 1986 and June 1997, the European Parliament passed 16 resolutions on the territory, in response to particular incidents or as general statements of policy.

The first clear signal that EU policymakers had begun to pay attention to East Timor came in September 1988, when the EU president (at the time the presidency was held by Germany), addressed the 43rd plenary session of the UN General Assembly. He spoke of the need for an acceptable international settlement in the territory. However, he did not refer to the right to self-determination of the East Timorese people or to human rights.

A European Parliament resolution of October 1988 included 18 recommendations for action and a request to the Indonesian government to allow human rights organisations complete freedom within East Timor. It also called on the governments of all EU member states to halt the sale of military equipment to Indonesia until the illegal occupation is ended, and requested the Council to work towards a ceasefire in the territory so that a referendum could be held.[6] Another motion, following Indonesian repression during a visit by Pope John Paul II to East Timor in 1989, referred to the 'genocide' being perpetrated by Indonesia in the territory.[7] In 1991 the Parliament again promoted the idea of a referendum on self-determination and requested that it be allowed to send a delegation to East Timor.[8]

Unfortunately, the European Parliament has a very limited role in making EU policy. It was not until the Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991, when firm evidence of Indonesian oppression was broadcast on television screens the world over, that the EU issued a statement condemning Indonesia.[9] This did not translate into a consensual position within the United Nations, however. Attempts during Portugal's presidency of the EU in 1992 to get the 12 EU members to agree a submission for the UNCHR were stymied in Geneva by the United States which sought a more conciliatory approach.[10]

In 1994 the Council of the EU issued a statement reaffirming the need for human rights to be observed if the 'efforts undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General with a view to a just, lasting and internationally acceptable solution to the East Timor question'[11] were to be successful. It also called for international organisations to have free access to the territory.

During 1994 and 1995, the European Parliament was particularly active on East Timor: four resolutions were passed and nine questions were asked. During this time the Commission's concern for East Timor was largely focused on the Asia Working Group, which was preparing the Common Position for eventual approval by the Council of Ministers. The Asia Working Group is made up of diplomatic officials from each of the member states and meets approximately once a month to work out the nuts and bolts of policy goals set out by the Council. It was within this group that competing or harmonious national interests were worked out in detail to achieve the consensus required for the Common Position.

THE COMMON POSITION

The Common Position can be viewed as a limiting document, where only the actions specified in it can be considered; or it can be viewed as an enabling document, one that provides a basic framework for many different policies or actions. Before attempting to assess it according to these alternatives, we must look at the significance of the Common Position itself.

The Common Position asserts that East Timor is an international issue, implicitly rejecting

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EU structure

The EU has three significant institutions, the European Commission, the Council of Ministers (known as the Council), and the Parliament, each of which has its own interests, powers and functions. Their roles are not always smoothly coordinated and competition between them for authority and jurisdiction in particular areas does occur. To complicate matters further, the institutional and legal basis of the EU's external relations is still somewhat in flux.

In general, however, the European Commission has the power to make policy proposals. The ideas for these can come from the Commission itself, from the Council, from a court judgment or from other relevant groups such as national or EU-wide pressure groups. A proposal goes from the Commission to the Council of Ministers which has the power to enact and sign it. The Council is made up of representatives of members states (usually ministers for foreign affairs) and the presidency of the Council rotates among the member states every six months . The Council also consults the European Parliament whose members are directly elected by the citizens of member states. The Parliament may offer its opinion on any proposal and, in some cases, has the power to delay the legislature and propose amendments. The Council can ask the Commission to redraft proposals in line with Parliament's amendments. All proposals must rest on an article of the EU Treaty.[12]

Although the Parliament now has some control over budgetary decisions and there is a procedure in place for stopping a proposal, it has little real influence over the policy process. This effective lack of accountability has implications for the EU's foreign policy agenda.

The role of NVOs in EU policymaking must also be recognised. EU foreign policy is made by heads of states and they and their cabinet members are sensitive to public opinion and coordinated campaigns on issues of foreign policy. For example, in the early 1990s the East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign (ETISC) ensured that East Timor became a priority foreign policy issue for the government during Ireland's tenure of the EU presidency in 1995/96.

The EU treaty

The Treaty of the European Union (known as the Maastricht Treaty), which came into force in 1993, established what are known as the 'three pillars' of the EU. Policies relating to development cooperation and humanitarian aid belong to the first pillar where the Commission plays the most significant and powerful role. All other foreign and security policy decisions come under the second pillar – they remain intergovernmental and in these cases the power to devise and shape policy is still held by national governments. The distinction between these two pillars largely derives from the reluctance of member states to hand over aspects of national sovereignty to the collective community process.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is a decision-making institution. The result of the Single European Act of 1986, the Maastricht Treaty, and the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, it was designed to provide a single European voice on foreign affairs.[13] Common Positions and Common Actions are devised from a consensual decision-making procedure, which means that those with the strongest positions compromise towards a more widely acceptable middle ground. The process of forming Common Positions inevitably produces the lowest common denominator.

The Treaty of Amsterdam this year introduced changes to the CFSP designed to overcome the enormous difficulty of arriving at a consensus between 15 different states with different economic and political interests and different ethical concerns. While not rejecting the ideal of consensus, a 'constructive abstention procedure' which allows states to withdraw from implementing decisions without vetoing them, was adopted. On 'minor matters' decisions can be taken by qualified majority voting, where such matters are understood as specific aspects of an already agreed Common Position or Common Action. However, if any state objects for 'important and stated reasons of national policy' to a particular vote, the vote will not proceed unless the Council decrees, by unanimous vote, that it should.[14] In this way, the Amsterdam Treaty (which has not yet been ratified) both smoothes the way towards greater coordination of foreign policy and allows states an 'out' from policies which they do not support.

As the Common Position on East Timor preceded the Amsterdam Treaty it is still unclear whether the new provisions allow states to opt out of implementing the policies on East Timor. It is possible, for instance, that a state which feels that a key national policy might be damaged by sanctions against Indonesia, might want to use the constructive abstention procedure and thus diminish the impact of a Common Action.

Indonesia's claim that involvement by any other state is an infringement of sovereignty. The Common Position affirms that international human rights laws (such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights) act as a counterweight to the national law of Indonesia and the occupied territory. Article 2.4 of the Common Position calls on the Indonesian government to implement relevant decisions adopted by the UNCHR and supports the longstanding UN-sponsored talks between Indonesia and Portugal and the All-inclusive Intra East Timorese Dialogue (AIETD).

Article 2.5 specifically commits aid resources to strengthen human rights in the territory. Its wording is important: it says the function of aid is both to improve the conditions of the people on the ground (in other words provide humanitarian aid for material conditions) and to strengthen respect for human rights in the territory. The focus on aid's potential to improve human rights is echoed throughout the Common Position.

However, the Common Position makes no specific reference to self-determination. Article 1.1 refers to the 'legitimate aspirations' of the Timorese people, a vaguer notion which may or may not refer to the political status of the territory. Given that the United Nations had declared the occupation illegal under international law and that the Common Position reasserts its support for UN involvement in the region, and given that all EU statements on East Timor have been framed by the notion that Indonesian rule is illegal, this anomaly is difficult to explain. It could be that EU members were anxious not to provoke an angry response from the Indonesians by explicitly referring to self-determination. In addition, four of the five policies which the Common Position refers to deal with initiatives which already exist under the aegis of the United Nations. Only the proposed aid package offers anything that does not suggest the EU is deferring to the United Nations as the lead agency for bringing change and exerting pressure on the Indonesian government.

It is certainly important that the European Union supports UN initiatives on East Timor – the more coordinated the international community is the more powerful its impact can be. But the importance of the European Union as a single voice cannot be underestimated, especially as there is a growing relationship between the EU and the ASEAN, in which Indonesia is a key actor. In the early 1990s the EU's aid policy towards the Asian region shifted from one based on development cooperation to one based on economic cooperation, and diplomatic initiatives on democratisation and human rights shifted from confrontation to 'constructive engagement'.[15] This shift is best understood in terms of dominant norms in international relations where trade is seen as the engine of economic development and the best guarantee of promoting democratisation, civic freedoms and global stability.

Although all EU member states are obliged to comply with the decision-making procedure of the CFSP, bilateral relations between any member state and Indonesia are not precluded. Because the CFSP is still intergovernmental, individual member states may decide to go it alone, taking unilateral action against, or indeed in support of, Indonesia. As is clear from the arms trade[16] or from Portugal's role in the UN talks, the thrust towards coordination does not prevent member states from carving out individual relationships with Indonesia. The relevant article in the Maastricht Treaty obliges member states to ensure that their national policies 'conform' to the Common Position.[17]

Ironically perhaps, the relative vagueness of the Common Position on East Timor makes it a potentially powerful document. For example, although it does not spell out the goal of establishing a human rights monitoring unit in East Timor, its general commitment to strengthening human rights would not preclude a member state from seeking to promote such a policy within the EU. In this way member governments and civil society groups could use the Common Position on East Timor to great effect.

Over the next year, the policies of the UK will provide a test case for the ability of EU member states to implement the spirit of the Common Position through a more active national policy. Attention will be focused on the UK, not just because of new Labour's commitment to changing its policies on Indonesia, but also because the UK presidency of the EU begins in January 1998. The UK government has agreed to tighten the criteria for arms exports to prevent weapons being sold which might be used for internal repression or external aggression, and to shift the emphasis of its aid policies from promoting trade to promoting human rights. At meetings with the Nobel peace prize winners, José Ramos-Horta and Bishop Carlos Belo, foreign secretary Robin Cook also pledged that the UK would continue to support UN-mediated efforts to negotiate a settlement within East Timor.[18] The arrival at the Council of Ministers of a government concerned for East Timor will significantly boost the Portuguese government's initiatives within the EU.

IMPLEMENTING THE COMMON POSITION

EU states have been slow to implement the Common Position, and any efforts to do so have lacked transparency. Portugal was the main proponent of action in the months immediately after the adoption of the Common Position, proposing in October 1996 that moves be made on two fronts: delivering aid and improving the human rights situation.

However, in April 1997, 10 months after the Common Position was agreed, Christine Oddy (a UK MEP of the Socialist Group) was told that no decision had yet been taken by the European Commission about how to implement the Common Position. Commissioner Manuel Marin, said that 'all possible means for assisting the development of the people of East Timor, particularly in the fields of health, sanitation and education' were being explored.[19] The Commission has issued no other public statements.

There are three policy areas to consider: the aid package, the commitment to strengthen human rights, and the EU's support for UN peacemaking activities. The fraught issue of coherence — whether the policies of national governments 'cohere' with the general principles of the Common Position — is also important.

1. Aid

On the basis of the 27 November 1996 Council decision, the Commission decided to launch a 6 million ECU aid package over three years for health, sanitation and education. So far the International Committee of the Red Cross has received funding for a water and sanitation project. However, other NGOs are being consulted, including European-based Catholic aid agencies. It is expected that further details of the package will be made public before the end of 1997.

Preliminary assessment

That the EU has decided to channel its funds through non-governmental agencies rather than through the Indonesian government is encouraging, as are the choices of priority areas. Health, education and sanitation are all crucial development needs. But the aid must be effective. International NGOs with a good track record on East Timor now need to monitor implementation while the European Union must continue to consult with legitimate representatives of the East Timorese people on priorities.

Accountability procedures will also be important, given the European Union's dominance in the provision of aid. There is a potential clash between the institutional interests of the EU in ensuring clean and efficient delivery of aid and the interests of aid recipients and the NGOs delivering the programme. A detailed study of an aid programme undertaken by NGOs and the EU in Cambodia has shown that NGOs (both international and local) prefer small scale projects which take a long term view and are based on community development. The EU, on the other hand, prefers large scale projects which work through governments, use sophisticated technology, and have a short term 'rapid impact'.[20]

Although in East Timor the European Union will not work through the Indonesian government, the research does suggest there are some difficulties inherent in implementing aid policies. NVOs monitoring the package are keen to see evidence of a gender based approach to project formulation, monitoring, assessment and evaluation. They will also be looking for a human rights implementation component within the aid package. Lastly, it is important that aid does not become an excuse for EU political inactivity on East Timor.

2. Strengthening human rights

To date there is no evidence that the European Union plans to implement policies arising from the Common Position which directly target human rights violations in the territory. However, EU members, led by the Dutch presidency, orchestrated an effective campaign to persuade a majority in the United Nations to support a strong condemnation of Indonesia's human rights record in East Timor at the UNCHR in April 1997.[21] The vote was carried by a margin of seven, and although the UN resolution did not necessarily derive from the Common Position, it has been suggested that the agreement already reached in Europe made its adoption easier.

Normally, the state under consideration at the UNCHR participates in informal negotiations before the vote, but in this case Indonesian representatives chose not to. They were reported to be 'furious' with the resolution, saying it was one-sided and highly intrusive.[22] Perhaps Indonesia underestimated the strength of opinion and failed to keep a significant number of key players on its side and in favour of the principle of sovereignty. The result was a serious blow to the Indonesian representatives at the UN.

On the other hand, it has been argued that the resolution must be viewed with caution until there is greater coherence between the trade, aid and financial policies adopted by individual UN members towards Indonesia.[23] Although the motion is welcome, there is evidence that human rights violations in the territory have continued in 1997,[24] and eye witnesses at the May 1997 elections claimed that not everything was entirely above board.[25]

The effectiveness of UN declarations, when little action follows from its members at regional or global level, is open to question.

3. Supporting UN talks

Two series of talks have been running under the aegis of the UN, the tripartite talks between the UN and the governments of Indonesia and Portugal, and the AIETD. The latest round of the tripartite talks took place in New York from 4-7 August 1997 and were chaired by a special ambassador from the UN, Pakistani diplomat Jamsheed Marker. The talks were unique in that they took place between officials (as opposed to politicians). Although no great breakthrough took place, the shift to diplomat-based talks may be a sign of progress as it indicates that there is a possibility of real negotiations between Portugal and Indonesia. Similar procedural developments at the AIETD talks are also hopeful – there is to be greater participation from the Timorese side, with new representatives of youth and women.

Has the Common Position brought change in EU support for the talks? There is no evidence that the EU has provided any particular support for the talks. Although Portugal keeps its EU partners informed of progress, it is not clear if a more active part played by member states or the President would be welcomed by the Portuguese. Indeed, there is an apparent reluctance to establish another set of parallel or supporting structures which might diminish the focus on the tripartite talks.

4. Coherence

The Common Position has highlighted the issue of 'coherence' between the values of the document and the trade, economic and diplomatic policies of individual member states. The difficulty is that there is little consistency between the policies of the EU and those of its individual member states, nor between the external relations developed by the European Union and the positions taken in the CFSP.[26] This is not peculiar to the European Union's relations with Indonesia but is especially acute in this case because of the issue of sovereignty. Coherence is also a problem at the United Nations.

According to the UN motion and the EU Common Position, EU member states do not accept the legitimacy of Indonesian rule in East Timor. Yet there is ample evidence that individual member states are trading weapons and providing military support which bolsters Indonesian rule in the territory.[27] The same lack of 'coherence' can be seen between the EU's condemnation of human rights abuses and the continued supply by its members of weapons which can be used to abuse human rights. Aside from the ethical aspects, the EU's double standards undermine European involvement in the region in the eyes of Indonesia and other ASEAN nations.

DISCUSSION

The EU's focus on implementing the aid package, and its neglect of the other dimensions of the Common Position, could suggest that the EU has taken a minimalist approach to that position. However, it could also reflect lack of coordination among EU institutions and the inherent slowness of the process of deciding on and enacting legislation.

There does appear to be particular ambiguity about which pillar of the EU Treaty the aid package falls under. Is it entirely derivative of the Common Position and therefore within the remit of the CFSP (pillar two), subject entirely to the direction and control of national governments? Or is it entirely in the remit of economic cooperation (pillar one) and hence controlled by the Commission, specifically Commissioner Manuel Marin, who has responsibility for external affairs and development cooperation for parts of Asia and elsewhere? Perhaps all that can be said for certain is that design and implementation of the package is being negotiated through the office of Commissioner Marin, which implies that it is viewed as belonging to pillar one. However, the shape that the package takes has implications for the EU's foreign policy, and particularly for political relations between the EU and Indonesia.

To date, the Common Position on East Timor has been regarded by the EU as largely a humanitarian policy, perhaps because the Commission office responsible for aid was instructed to devise the policies. However, the nature of EU-Indonesian relations may also play a part. Several officials have pointed out that the size of Indonesia's market, its importance in the ASEAN region, and its rejection of any attempt by the international community to intervene in what Indonesia insists are internal affairs, are significant factors.

Nonetheless, in implementing the aid package the EU will be forced to confront the root of the problem within the territory – its illegal occupation by Indonesia. Aid may be a 'softer' option than taking a stand on human rights but Indonesia will have to be negotiated with or worked around. Workers will have to be placed within the territory and the impact of aid on the ground will have to be evaluated. In all of this, the EU will do its utmost not to be seen to be legitimising the illegal occupation. Thus the stated commitment of the EU to finding a solution which respects international law means that the politics of East Timor will have to be faced. NVOs, as a voice of civil society, can push for greater coherence between the aid package and the EU's political and economic stance in the region, thereby ensuring that the sum total of EU activity arising from the Common Position is not a three-year aid programme. ■

Specific lobbying issues for NVOs

1. Press for adequate monitoring and evaluation of the aid package, and for EU countries' bilateral aid to be harmonised with the EU Common Position.
2. Insist that EU leaders demand Indonesia implements the 1997 UNCHR resolution.
3. Continue to press for the permanent establishment of a human rights monitoring presence in East Timor. This could be facilitated through the UN or through the offices of the EU.
4. Use the forthcoming Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in London on 3-5 April 1998 as a focus for tactical lobbying on the Common Position.
5. Highlight the lack of coherence between the EU member states' relationships with Indonesia, particularly in relation to the arms trade. The arms trade comes under the jurisdiction of the member states (not the Commission) and therefore decisions on it are accountable within the national political arena. EU governments should be pressed to ensure that *no* arms are sold to Indonesia in contravention of the Common Position on East Timor. Members of the European Parliament should be engaged through the Intergroup on East Timor and the Human Rights Group.
6. Overall, the Common Position should be monitored so that it can be used to its full potential.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. EU aid package

The European Commission should monitor and evaluate the aid package to ensure it improves the material situation of East Timorese people and strengthens respect for human rights. The aid package should not be an end in itself, but an instrument to help settle the conflict within East Timor. The broader perspective of the Common Position, and commitments given by the EU at the 53rd session of the UNCHR, must be kept to the fore. Ultimately, the test of any policy is its impact on the ground.

2. The UNCHR resolution

As sponsors of the UN resolution, EU member states should ensure that the key recommendations are implemented. In particular, they should pursue their commitment to strengthening human rights in the territory before the 54th session of the UNCHR in April 1998, by seeking action on the recommendations to:

a) invite the special rapporteur on torture to visit East Timor
b) provide access for human rights organisations to East Timor
c) ensure the early release of East Timorese people detained or convicted for political reasons.

In addition, EU governments should bear in mind that these are only elements of a broader programme – on-site human rights monitoring might also be needed.

3. Coherence

EU member states should coordinate their aid and trade policies to ensure coherence around the Common Position. Bilateral aid programmes should be harmonised with those of the EU, and multilateral aid programmes should be brought into line. Both a thorough examination of the consequences of the arms trade and a strengthening of existing regulations on arms sold to Indonesia are needed. Sales of weapons should not be allowed to undermine human rights protection in East Timor.

4. The European Parliament

The European Parliament should pursue its intention of sending a parliamentary delegation to East Timor. In particular, the Parliament can use this trip to push the Commission and the Council to pursue aspects of the Common Position relating to human rights and peace talks. This could be coordinated through the new Intergroup for Solidarity with the People of East Timor.[27] This group should monitor the planning, conduct and outcome of any visit by the Council, such as the EU troika visit to East Timor suggested by British foreign secretary Robin Cook.

5. European NVOs

European NVOs should coordinate their activities to ensure the above ends are met. They should not lose sight of the framework for action provided by the Common Position on East Timor and should attempt to hold their home governments to account in their relations with Indonesia. The Common Position is the only mechanism through which EU and national policy towards East Timor will be framed in the foreseeable future. NVOs should regard the Common Position as an enabling document, with potential, rather than a narrow and restrictive policy. While the document is not binding in any legal sense it is binding politically and morally.

In particular, NVOs should focus on the member states of the EU troika (the current President, the immediately preceding one and the forthcoming one). The UK – as a forthcoming president – provides a focus from January 1998. The UK's arms trade with Indonesia is a key issue where coherence may be legitimately raised.

Notes

1. The EU is used in this document to refer to the political entity which was born as the EEC (or the Common Market) with the Treaty of Rome in 1957. As referred to here, the EU includes the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, other institutions, member governments and NGOs.
2. Common Position 25 June 1996, No. 96/407 CFSP, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L168/2, 6 July 1996.
3. The remaining three articles met the conventional requirements of such statements indicating that the Council would be responsible for follow up, that the Common Position would apply from the date of its adoption and that it would be published in the *Official Journal* of the EU.
4. de Vasconcelos, Álvaro, 1996: 125.
5. Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, 1989. Articles 293.1 and 293.2, (second revision).
6. Resolution on East Timor. Doc. A 2-143/88. *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No. C 262/142, 15 September 1988.
7. Resolution on the situation in East Timor. Doc. B3-524/89, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No. C 323/107, 27 November 1989.

8. Resolution on the situation in South-East Asia. Doc. A 3-0219/91. *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No. c 267/160, 14 October 1991.
9. *Bulletin of the European Communities;* No. 12, 1991. The European Parliament had also issued a resolution condemning the massacre. See Joint Resolution on the Massacre in East Timor, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No. C 326/182, 16 December 1991.
10. de Vasconcelos, Álvaro, 1996: 126.
11. Council of the European Union, 'Statement by the European Union on East Timor', 18 July 1994, P.65/94, press release. Some months later, in conjunction with Sweden and Norway, the Council expressed its concern over the sentencing of Indonesian labour leader Muchtar Pakpahan. See Council of the European Union, 'Statement by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on Indonesia', 22 November 1994, P.99/94, press release.
12. For a step by step account of the relations between the institutions see chapter 4 in Nicoll and Salmon, 1994.
13. Article J.2 of the Maastricht Treaty established that, where necessary, a Common Position on a particular issue area would be adopted and that the national policies of all members states would adhere to that position.
14. *IGC Update 1997*, Institute of European Affairs, Dublin, No. 9, June: 5.
15. Stankovitch, Mara, 1996.
16. For details of arms trade between EU members and Indonesia see ENAAT, 1997.
17. Article J.2, Title V of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.
18. See *Timor Link*, No. 40, July 1997, for a detailed analysis of new Labour and East Timor.
19. Manuel Marin to Christine Oddy, 25 April 997. Doc EN/QE/322/322301.
20. Bullard, Nicola, 1996. The study was of a US$44 million project for rural development in Cambodia which ran from January 1995 to June 1997.
21. Resolution on Situation of Human Rights in East Timor, 53rd session of the UNCHR, Geneva, 16 April 1997. See *Timor Link*, CIIR, No. 39, April 1997 for complete text.
22. *Maubere*, June 1997.
23. *Timor Link*, No. 39, 1997.
24. East Timor Human Rights Centre, 1997, *Human Rights Deteriorate in East Timor*, ETHRC, Collingwood, Australia, Ref: SR2/97.
25. Carey, Peter, 1997, *Irish Times*, 28 May 1997.
26. Krenzler, Horst-Gunter, and Schneider, Henning C, 1997: 133.
27. The three co-chairs of the group are Heidi Hautula (Greens, Finland), Tony Cunningham (Labour Party, UK) and Carlos Costa Neves (PSD, Portugal).

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This supplement is published with issue 41 of *Timor Link* by CIIR, Unit 3 Canonbury Yard, 190a New North Road, London N1 7BJ, UK.